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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the threatened legal attack against
"Big Food", modeled after the lawsuits brought against "Big
Tobacco."' Critics charge that food manufacturers spend billions of
dollars marketing their products to children who are young,
impressionable, and unable to make their own informed consumer
* Partner, General Litigation Group, Faegre & Benson LLP in Minneapolis.
Associate, General Litigation Group, Faegre & Benson LLP in Minneapolis.
1. See generally Forrest Lee Andrews, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits
Prepare to Take on the Fast Food Industry, 15 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 153
(2004) (charting legal arguments that could be used to hold the fast food
industry accountable for deceptive pricing); Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What
to Eat, and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big Problems Ahead for "Big
Food"?, 39 GA. L. REv. 839 (2005) (asserting that litigation modeled after
lawsuits against "Big Tobacco" should be curtailed in favor of legislation);
Alyse Meislik, Weighing In on the Scales of Justice: The Obesity Epidemic and
Litigation Against the Food Industry, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 781 (2004) (discussing
the similarities between the tobacco and food industries, and the need for the
food industry to follow tobacco companies' lead to curtail exposure to
litigation); Marguerite Higgins, Advocates Meet to Plan Big Mac Attack on
Fat, WASH. TIMES, June 22, 2003, at Al (citing Boston obesity litigation
strategy conference based on successful lawsuits against tobacco companies);
Laura Parker, Legal Experts Predict New Round in Food Fight, USA TODAY,
May 7-9, 2004, at 3A (predicting the imminent filing of additional lawsuits
against the food industry, alleging that they had mislead consumers about the
nutritional value of food); Kate Zernike, Lawyers Shift Focus From Big
Tobacco to Big Food, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at A 15 (reporting on litigation
against the food industry using deceptive marketing arguments utilized against
the tobacco industry).
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decisions.2  Citing, among other things, obesity rates among
children, 3 plaintiffs and advocacy groups have challenged this child-
targeted advertising under both traditional tort law and state
consumer protection statutes.4 Plaintiffs bringing such lawsuits have
alleged that advertisers do the following: market an inherently
dangerous product; 5 fail to warn of the unhealthy attributes of food
products; 6 deceptively sell fatty addictive foods; 7 create false
impressions that the product is nutritious and part of a healthy
lifestyle; 8 fail to disclose the use of additives;9 fail to disclose that the
manner of processing food renders it less healthy than represented;1
0
deceptively represent that the company will provide nutritional
information;" and fail to disclose that consumption of the product
causes obesity, among other health conditions. 12
2. Andrews, supra note 1, at 164-66; Meislik, supra note 1, at 804.
3. See, e.g., Amended Verified Complaint at 2-3, Pelman v. McDonald's
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519-520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 CV 7821
(RWS)).
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See Amended Verified Complaint, supra, note 3, at 24 (alleging
negligence claim that McDonald's products are inherently dangerous because
of high levels of cholesterol, fat, sugar and salt).
6. See id. at28.
7. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. (Pelman 1), 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 542
(S.D.N.Y 2003), vacated in part by 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005).
8. Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 3, at 26 (suit brought under
the New York Consumer Protection Act); Tylka v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 96 C
1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) (suit brought under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act), vacated, 211
F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Cohen v. McDonald's Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1,
4 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (alleging that McDonald's violated the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by:
(1) misrepresenting that its food products have a nutritional value that
they do not have, (2) misrepresenting that its food products are of a
particular standard quality or grade, (3) misrepresenting nutrient
content values for foods targeted for consumption by children ages
one to three, and (4) failing to adhere to the National Labeling and
Education Act of 1990.).
9. Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 3, at 30.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id; see also Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest,
Food Watchdog Group Announces Litigation Initiative (May 3, 2005),
available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/200505031.html (announcing inten-
tion to "increasingly ... turn to the courts to stop deceptive labeling, fraudu-
lent advertising, and the use of dangerous food additives.").
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This Article addresses the use of consumer protection laws in
bringing claims against companies that advertise food products to
children and argues that there are avenues to reform, other than
litigation, that are better suited to address the issue of food
advertising to children. Part II examines the broad scope of state
consumer protection statutes which tend to eliminate elements of
traditional tort dlaims, thus making them an attractive tool for
plaintiffs suing food advertisers. Part III sets out the problems
associated with using litigation as a tool to address food advertising
to children. Part IV suggests that federal regulation and public
pressure are better suited to address the problem. Finally, Part V
concludes that consumer protection statutes are ill equipped to deal
with the medical, scientific, economic, and social issues associated
with food advertising to children.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES AS A TOOL
TO ADDRESS FOOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN
A. The Expansive Scope of Consumer Protection Statutes
Consumer protection statutes are increasingly popular vehicles
for bringing claims against companies marketing their food products
to children. Today, every state has some version of a consumer
protection statute.' Consumer protection statutes vary widely, but
generally prohibit "unfair," "deceptive," or "unconscionable" acts or
practices. 14  These statutes are usually very broadly drafted and,
13. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 23-35 (Richard A. Leiter ed.,
2d ed. 1997).
14. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2005) (defining "unfair
competition" as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising"); Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Businesses Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
505/2 (West 1999) (prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including
but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or
omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the
concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, or the use or
employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the 'Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001) (prohibiting
"any unconscionable commercial practice.., or the knowing concealment,
suppression, or omission of any material fact"); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349
(McKinney 2004) (making unlawful "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service
May 2006]
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consistent with legislative intent, courts give expansive meaning to
these statutory terms by applying them to prohibit a wide array of
conduct that is deemed "unfair," "immoral," or "unconscionable."' 5
Consumer protection laws are remarkable in that they tend to
dilute, or even eliminate, some of the key requirements of traditional
tort law.16 They go well beyond traditional common law fraud and
often do not require proof of scienter or reliance.' 7 State consumer
protection statutes have thus "eased the requirements for stating a
claim and have limited the defenses that are characteristic of
common law actions."' 8
Prior to being amended by voters in 2004, California's consumer
protection statute did not require plaintiffs to show injury. 19 In an
important early case applying California's Business and Professions
Code section 17200 to children's advertisements, plaintiffs in
in this state"). Several states, such as Illinois, have adopted the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. For the full text of the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, see UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966),
available at http://wvw.lawupenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
15. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. (Pelman III), 396 F.3d 508, 511 (2d
Cir. 2005) (stating that New York's Consumer Protection Statute goes "well
beyond common-law fraud to cover a broad range of deceptive practices");
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234-35
(1996) (noting that an unfair business practice occurs when that practice
"offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers"
(quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d
509, 530 (1984))); Tylka v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL
495126, at *4 (N.D. I11. July 1, 1999) (noting that because the terms of the
Illinois consumer protection act "are not subject to a precise definition,
whether a particular set of circumstances is 'unfair' or 'deceptive' is
determined on a case-by-case basis").
16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
17. See Murry's v. America's Mortgage Bank Inc., No. 03 C 2811, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12045, at *19 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2004) (actual reliance not
an element of statutory consumer fraud); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J.,
Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (scienter
not required); Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24, 29 (2000) (section 349
of New York's Consumer Protection Statute does not require proof of actual
reliance).
18. See 1 BUSINESS TORTS § 7.06 (Joseph D. Zamore et al. eds., 2001).
19. BILL ANALYSIS, ASSEMB. B. 102, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal.
2004), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0101-
0150/ab 102 cfa 20040112 141203 asm comm.html (citing the fact that "a
court may order restitution for violations of section 17500 without
individualized proof of deception, reliance, and, injury").
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Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
20
brought claims on behalf of California residents who claimed they
were misled or deceived in connection with defendants' marketing of
sugared cereals. 21 Relying in part on California Business and Profes-
sions Code sectibn 17200,22 plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
"engaged in a sophisticated advertising and marketing program
which is designed to capitalize on the unique susceptibilities of
children and preschoolers in order to induce them to consume
products which, although promoted and labelled [sic] as 'cereals,'
are in fact more accurately described as sugar products, or
candies."
23
Noting that "[a]llegations of actual deception, reasonable
reliance, and damage are unnecessary," 24 the court determined that
plaintiffs "need not plead the exact language of every deceptive
statement; it is sufficient for plaintiff to describe a scheme to mislead
customers, and allege that each misrepresentation to each customer
conforms to that scheme." 25  Thus, the court concluded that the
allegations were sufficient to overcome defendants' general
demurrer.
26
More recent cases further illustrate the potentially expansive use
of consumer protection statutes in this area. For example, in Tylka v.
Gerber Products Co.,27 plaintiffs brought claims of common law
fraud against Gerber for advertising baby food 28 in violation of the
20. 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983).
21. 1d. at663-64.
22. Until the California voters enacted Proposition 64 in 2004, California's
Unfair Competition Law, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2005), was
"arguably the broadest statutory scheme in the nation" and did not require
actual deception, reasonable reliance or damages. See Mathieu Blackston,
California's Unfair Competition Law-Making Sure the Avenger Is Not Guilty
of the Greater Crime, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1833, 1845 (2004) (detailing the
problems and abuses of section 17200). Proposition 64 enacted several
reforms, including requiring that a private plaintiff "suffer[] [an] injury in fact
and... los[s] [of] money or property" See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
17204, 17535.
23. Comm. on Children's Television, Inc., 673 P.2d at 664.
24. Id. at 668.
25. Id. at 669.
26. 1d. at671.
27. No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *1 (N.D. I11. July 1, 1999).
28. Tylka v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *1
(N.D. I1l. July 1, 1999).
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Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,29 and
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
30
Although the court granted summary judgment to Gerber
because plaintiffs could not show proximate cause,3 1 it noted that
"the [Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
or "ICFA"] affoids consumers broader protection than a common
law fraud action because it eliminates the element of scienter or the
necessity of proof of actual reliance." 32 The court ultimately rejected
the plaintiffs' argument 33 that, under the reasoning in Children's
Television, specific evidence of reliance was not required to show
fraud because of "the pervasiveness of the false advertising gives rise
to a presumption. of reliance." 34 The court noted that this argument
would "inject a new legal theory or presumption into the state's
jurisprudence and essentially modify the state's action at common
law.
3 5
In the well known Pelman36 case, the Second Circuit held that
the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under New
York's Consumer Protection Act.37 After the district court dismissed
the plaintiffs' original complaint,38 the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint based on violations of New York's Consumer Protection
Statute sections 349 and 350.39 Plaintiffs alleged that McDonald's
29. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 1999).
30. UNIF. DECEPTIvE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966), available at
http://www.law.upen.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf.
31. Tylka, at *12.15.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Seeid. at*13.
34. Id. at *12 (citing Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods
Corp., 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983)).
35. Id. at *13. While "individual issues of reliance and causation do not
thwart class actions of common law fraud or actions under the ICFA" at the
certification stage, on summary judgment plaintiffs "are expected to present at
least some proof to support each element of their claims." Id. at * 10.
36. Pelman III, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005). The district court's opinion is
instructive for plaintiffs seeking to file similar lawsuits, as it "laid out in some
detail the elements that a properly pleaded complaint would need to contain."
Pelman v. McDonald's Corp. (Pelman II), No. 02 Cir. 7821 (RWS), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2003).
37. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004).
38. Pelman II, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *42.
39. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349, 350. Plaintiffs dropped their failure-to-
warn claim before oral argument. Pelman II, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202,
at *5.
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advertising misled plaintiffs to believe that its food was nutritious,
failed to adequately disclose that its processing and additives made
certain foods less healthy, and failed to provide nutritional
information as advertised.40
While acknowledging that section 349 does not require reliance
on a deceptive practice,4' the lower court again dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint.42 This was in large part because in failing to
"address the role that 'a number of other factors other than diet may
come to play in obesity and the health problems of which the
plaintiffs complain,' ' 4 3 they failed "to draw an adequate causal
connection between their consumption of McDonald's food and their
alleged injur[y].'
The Second Circuit, addressing only the section 349 deceptive
acts claims, reversed the district court.4' The court concluded that
questions such as plaintiffs' diets and exercise habits, and family
health history were appropriate for discovery.46 Moreover, the
complaint's failure to answer these questions was not fatal.47
Pelman48 is a significant decision because it will likely encourage
plaintiffs lawyers to use consumer protection statutes to challenge
food advertising aimed at children.
B. Use of Consumer Protection Statutes in Recent Litigation
A recent example of the expansive use of consumer protection
statutes in the area of food advertising is the lawsuit filed by Jennifer
Hardee in San Diego County, California against Kraft Foods,
General Mills, Kellogg and others on behalf of a purported class of
consumers who purchased the defendants' breakfast cereals. 49 The
40. Pelman H1, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *6.
41. Id. at *19-20.
42. Id. at *42. i
43. Id. at *31 (quoting Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)).
44. Id. at *30.
45. See Pelman II1, 396 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 511-12.
47. Id. at 512 (remanding only portions of the district court's dismissal).
48. 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005).
49. See Complaint, Hardee v. Del Mission Liquor, No. 844745, 2005 WL
770589 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Hardee Complaint]. In
addition, advocacy groups and parents announced in January of 2006 that they
were bringing a lawsuit in Massachusetts against Nickelodeon and Kellogg Co.
May 2006]
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complaint alleges that the defendants' characterization of their
breakfast cereals as "low sugar" falsely represents that they have a
nutritional advantage over other cereals, "when in fact, the removed
sugar is replaced by other carbohydrates, thus offering no significant
nutritional advantage."50  The complaint asserts causes of action
under California Business and Professions Code section 17500,
California's False Advertising Law, and common law tort.5 The
complaint alleges that the damage to each plaintiff is the purchase
price of the product-"generally less than $10.00 ... 52
The Hardee lawsuit represents another legal evolution: a
traditional tort-style lawsuit in which the plaintiff claims no personal
injury." The benefits to plaintiffs and their lawyers are obvious:
defining the injury as purely economic allows a plaintiff to escape
the complicated and difficult burden of proving that the product
caused their obesity or other physical harm. 54 Whether this type of
suit is useful in addressing the larger social and scientific issues
raised by food advertising to children, however, is much less
certain.
55
III. PROBLEMS WITH LITIGATION AS
A TOOL TO ADDRESS FOOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN
As the cases discussed in Part II illustrate, plaintiffs' lawyers are
increasingly using state consumer protection statutes as a tool to
address a myriad of political, scientific, and public health issues
raised by food marketing to children.5 6 There are, however, serious
to stop the companies from marketing junk food to children when 15% or more
of the audience is eight years old or younger. Junk-food Suit Targets
Nickelodeon, Kellogg, CNN, Jan. 18, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/
0 1/kids.lawsuit.ap/index.html.
50. Complaint, supra note 49, at 2.
51. Id. at 4-7 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2005)).
52. ld. (alleging that as a result of acts violating sections 17200 and 17500,
"[d]efendants received and continue to hold money belonging to Plaintiff and
members of the general public who were led to purchase the above-described
'low sugar' products. ..
53. See id.
54. See Scott A. Elder & Anna Aven Sumner, State Consumer Protection
Laws Elevate Food Company Liability Risks, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash.,
D.C.), July 29, 2005, at 2.
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. See discussion supra Part II.
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problems with using adversarial litigation as a means to confront
these "unique and challenging issues" in which "[q]uestions of
personal responsibility, common knowledge and public health are
presented." 57 These questions implicate "the role of society and the
courts in addressing such issues."
5
First, litigation is always uncertain. In this area, liability is
particularly unpredictable. As noted above, consumer protection
statutes-not to mention common law causes of action-vary widely
by state. 59 Advertising that is lawful in one state may be unfair in
another, making :it difficult for companies to have "a clear idea of
what they must do to avoid economic penalties." 60 These lawsuits
raise complicated questions about the applicability of causation and
the role of traditional tort defenses such as comparative fault or
assumption of risk.6' Piecemeal and unpredictable litigation will
impede a consistent approach and imperil uniform results to the
important societal issues raised by food advertising to children.
Second, litigation is narrow and often case specific. 62 It may be
driven by the narrow interests of the particular plaintiff and
plaintiff's counsel. 63 Thus, a plaintiff's desired outcome in a
particular lawsuit may not be to cause industry-wide reform or to
establish educational programs aimed at nutritious eating, but rather
to get monetary damages to compensate an individual injury. 
64
Counsel are inevitably influenced by the availability of attorneys
fees, 65 raising legitimate questions about whether profit-driven
57. Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
60. Ausness, supra note 1, at 885-86.
61. Id. at 870 ("Proof of causation can be particularly difficult when
multiple potential causes are involved.").
62. Id. at 886.
63. Id. (noting that in litigation "both judges and lay juries often have
difficulty understanding technical or scientific data. In addition, access to
information is limited because litigants have no incentive to provide courts
with information unless it supports their position. Furthermore, the case-
specific nature of the litigation process induces judges and juries to focus on
narrow issues and directs their attention away from broader social or safety
concerns." (footnotes omitted)).
64. See supra note 63, and accompanying text.
65. Attorneys fees are recoverable in many states. For example, an award of
attorney's fees is possible in a California Unfair Competition Law action under
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to award
May 2006]
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plaintiffs' lawyers are capable of, and should be responsible for,
formulating public policy.66 In essence, "[a] primary goal of litiga-
tion is to compensate an aggrieved party for past wrongs, and can
cause a plaintiff's focus to shift from public policy objectives to
monetary damages."
67
As any practioner knows, litigation can be expensive and time
consuming, and it raises the prospect that an industry will be mired
in potentially burdensome discovery and pretrial proceed-ings.
68
Industry-wide threats will be met with vigorous and costly defenses
that can take vast resources and a very long time to resolve. 69 These
resources could be better spent addressing the broader public policy
implications.
The Hardee70 case is a good example. On July 28, 2005, the
parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, 71 stating that they had
executed a settlement agreement obligating the defendants to make
changes to their cereal labeling and pay Hardee's attorney's fees.72
Moreover, the stipulation requested that Hardee's complaint be
attorney's fees in "the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest" to a successful party where "a significant benefit ... has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons.. . ." CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2005).
66. Professor John Banzhaf, well-known from the tobacco litigation
observed, "I don't profit from these suits, but other attorneys will, and that may
be the incentive they need to take on an organization." Higgins, supra note 1,
at Al.
67. Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A
Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1334, 1379 (2001) (footnote omitted).
68. In response to the Second Circuit's decision in Pelman III, Professor
Banzhaf observed that the decision "is going to scare the hell out of
McDonald's and every other fast food company .... We can now demand a
lot of their secret documents." Richard J. Keshian, My Big Fat Lawsuit:
Obesity Claims-The New Frontier?, DEF. REs. INST., 20-21 (2005)
(quotations omitted); see also Ausness, supra note 1, at 886-87 (complex
nature of issues likely to incur high litigation costs); Samuel J. Romero,
Obesity: A Super-Sized Problem or a Small Fry in the Inevitable Development
of Product Liability?, 7 CHAPMAN L. REV. 239, 272-73 (2004) (pointing to
increased insurance costs for the fast-food industry due to exposure to
liability).
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. Hardee v. Del Mission Liquor, No. GIC 844745, 2005 WL 770589
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2005).
71. Stipulation for the Plaintiffs, Hardee, 2005 WL 770589.
72. Id. at 1.
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dismissed with prejudice, and that the putative class' claims be
dismissed without prejudice. 73 However, the court issued a Notice of
Tentative Disapproval of the proposed settlement and dismissal,
finding that California Rule of Court 1859(a)74 applied and required
a noticed hearing before dismissal of the putative classes' claims.
75
The court noted that the proposal before it was a settlement, not
merely a dismissal that did not require a hearing,76 because Hardee
would receive the relief she had prayed for in her complaint as
consideration for the dismissal: changes to product labeling, as well
as attorney's fees that "exceed[ed] $1,000,000." 77 The court refused
to find that settlement and dismissal without prejudice of the putative
class' claims would not prejudice the class.
78
As Hardee shows, litigation is not always a quick fix. Using the
court system to enact industry change is not as easy as reaching a
settlement after filing a putative class action.79 In particular, class
action litigation is governed by rules and procedures that courts
enforce. This can lead to lengthy, complicated, and expensive
proceedings.
80
Thus, litigation may not expedite broad public benefits to
consumers the way that government and industry-sponsored
education campaigns would. As the Center for Science in the Public
Interest has observed:
[M]odest corporate restraints on the advertising of
processed foods will not increase the marketing of truly
healthful foods-like fruits, vegetables, and fat-free dairy
products-that should form the bulk of children's diets.
That's where government needs to step in and sponsor
major healthy-eating campaigns, ensure that processed
73. Id.
74. CAL. R. CT. 1859(a).
75. See Notice of Tentative Disapproval at 2, Hardee, 2005 WL 770589
("A settlement or compromise of an entire class action, or of a cause of action,
or as to a party, requires the approval of the court after hearing." (quoting CAL.
R. CT. 1859(a))).
76. Id; see CAL. R. CT. 1860(a) ("A dismissal of an entire class action, or of
any party or cause of action in a class action, requires court approval.")
77. Notice of Tenitative Disapproval, supra note 75, at 2.
78. Id.
79. See Jensen, supra note 67, at 1379 (citing ineffectiveness of litigation
against tobacco companies in achieving public policy goals).
80. Ausness, supra note 1, at 886.
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foods are more healthful, and strengthen nutrition education
in schools.
8 '
Finally, the legislative and executive branches are better equipped to
meaningfully address issues raised by advertising to children.
8 2
Courts generally 'adjudicate a single dispute based on the arguments
and evidence presented by the parties to that dispute. 83 Whereas
courts make decisions based on the facts of a particular individual's
case, the legislative branch is equipped to enact broad prospective
policy goals based on input from a wide range of viewpoints.
84
Moreover, unlike litigation, the legislative and regulatory processes
include hearings and expert testimony, and may include the commis-
sion of studies.
85
Thus, litigation may not promote better nutrition or deal with
broader issues such as advertising in schools or the availability of
soft drink machines to students. The legislative and regulatory
processes are better equipped to consider the medical, scientific,
social, and ethical questions raised by food marketing to children.
86
Legislatures can take into account the expertise and opinions of
communities, health professionals, parents and schools.
87
There are no easy answers to the issues raised by food adver-
tising to children-particularly the question of what causes obesity
81. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Kraft
Advertising-to-Kids Policy Applauded (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://
cspinet.org/new/200501125.html.
82. Ausness, supra note 1, at 885. Regarding the judiciary, Jensen notes:
The often unelected nature of the judiciary undercuts the idea of
allowing judges to formulate policy affecting the nation as a whole.
Although judges may be objective, without their own constituencies
there is no guarantee that judges will hear or even consider a diverse
range of opinions and alternatives. The structure of the judiciary also
does not allow it to serve as an appropriate forum for the resolution of
policy disputes. Without investigatory and research resources, a
court's opinionis likely less informed than that of a legislature or an
executive agency. Devising a regulatory regime also requires the
analysis of complex data and conflicting theories, tasks that regulatory
agencies with their specialized expertise are better suited to perform.
Jensen, supra note 67, at 1381 (footnotes omitted).
83. Ausness, supra note 1, at 886.
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85. Ausness, supra note 1, at 885.
86. See id.
87. See id.
288
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or obesity-related diseases. These are multifactor problems involve-
ing medical, scientific, social, psychological, and economic factors.
88
"No injury" lawsuits such as Hardee8 9 underscore the scientific and
legal difficulties of asking the court system to resolve these
questions.90
Relying on adversarial litigation to resolve the issues raised by
food advertising to children requires courts to regulate business and
juries to decide complicated issues of health and science-tasks that
are better suited to the other branches of government.
IV. N6N-LITIGATION OPTIONS: A BETTER WAY
There are numerous ways, aside from resorting to litigation, for
society to address the issues raised by food advertising to children.
The industry's self-regulating body, the Children's Advertising
Review Unit, could be strengthened. 9' Congress could pass
legislation enabling the Federal Trade Commission to regulate
marketing to children. 92 For example, in May 2005, Senator Thomas
Harkin introduced legislation that would give the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Agriculture authority to regulate
the way food companies market food to children.93 Industry-wide
nutrition standards for marketing food to children could incorporate
input from experts, academia, government, and industry.
94
88. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S
CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 1
(2001), available at https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/callto
action/calltoaction.pdf.
89. See discussion supra Part III.
90. See Elder & Sumner, supra note 54, at 1.
91. The Children's Advertising Review Unit is a division of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus. Children's Advertising Review Unit, http://www.
caru.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
92. See Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, 'Self-
Regulation' of Food Marketing Is More Like Self-Preservation, Says CPSI
(July 14, 2005), available at https://www.cspinet.org/new/200507141 .html.
93. See Press Release, Website of Senator Thomas Harkin, Harkin Calls on
Food Industry to Limit Junk Food Advertising Aimed at Kids (Mar. 16, 2005),
http://harkin.senate.gov/news.cfin?id=233655.
94. Such standards have been proposed by the Center for Science in the
Public Interest. See CTR. FOR SCI. PUB. INTEREST, GUIDELINES FOR
RESPONSIBLE FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN (2005), https://www.cspinet
.org/marketingguidelines.pdf.
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Public pressure can also bring change. 95 The food industry has,
in fact, changed its practices in response to public pressure. For
example, Kraft Foods halted its advertising of certain foods and
drinks to children under twelve years old, 96 while General Mills
announced that it would convert its cereals to whole grain.
97
V. CONCLUSION
Food advertising to children raises important public policy and
public health questions that should not be answered by a litigation
system not designed to handle such broad public policy questions.
General consumer protection statutes, while having social utility, are
not equipped to answer the medical, scientific, economic, and social
questions raised by the obesity epidemic among children.
Moreover, the topic of food advertising to children raises
complex issues that need to be addressed comprehensively. For
these reasons, regulation and reform of the food industry should be
left to the legislative and executive branches which are better
equipped than the courts to deal with the broad policy questions at
issue.
95. Andrews, supra note 1, at 180 (noting that "[i]t is not the voice of
lawmakers or the courts reaching the fast food industry's ears, but rather
consumers themselves....").
96. Thomas Lee, Aiming at Kids.: Pressure Builds on Foodmakers,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 23, 2005, at ID, available at http://www
.commercialfreechildhood.org/news/articles/pressurebuildsonfoodmakers.htm.
97. 1d.
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